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Nunca Mas or D ji Vu?
CHARLES H. BROWER IIt
Known as an ethnic melting pot,' the country possessed abundant
natural resources, 2 an educated population, 3 and a remarkable constitu-
tional tradition.4 Responding to stunning attacks by a group of brutal
terrorists,5 the government declared and prosecuted a war based on the
doctrine of national security.6 In so doing, officials refused to apply the
Geneva Conventions,7 which did not contemplate a new kind of conflict
against terrorists who did not wear uniforms, did not fight on traditional
battlefields, and did not use conventional methods.8 Given the novelty
of the conflict and the threat to Western civilization, 9 the government
concluded that terrorism justified any defensive response, "no matter
how cruel."'
Seeing few distinctions between combatants and their supporters, the
government adopted a definition of "terrorists" that encompassed both
groups.1' Using this broad definition, it captured thousands of people,
most of whom had never committed hostile acts.' 2 Fearing that sus-
pected terrorists would invoke the protections of the system they sought
to destroy, 13 the government denied them opportunities to challenge
their detention in civilian courts.14 As a result, some disappeared into
secret detention centers 5 where the government applied methods of in-
terrogation that included near-drowning.' 6 Others became victims of
sexual violence, including detention and interrogation in a state of
forced nudity.17 Stories began to circulate about a sinister pattern of
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flights by government aircraft engaged in a practice so disturbing that
people referred to it only by euphemism.1 8 Perhaps for the first time in
the country's history, systematic abuse of human beings had become of-
ficial policy.' 9 An iconic naval facility became synonymous with that
policy and, thus, the focus of international outrage. °
During this fearful period, the government viewed investigative jour-
nalists as a threat to the social consensus that supported recourse to ex-
traordinary measures. 2' To discourage their curiosity, the government
threatened to prosecute reporters for disclosing facts that might preju-
dice the struggle against terrorism. 22 It also chided non-governmental
organizations for reporting questionable allegations made by suspected
terrorists, even though the government's own penchant for secrecy had
eliminated access to more reliable sources.23
Under the circumstances just described, the country's population re-
mained poorly informed about the mistreatment of those detained as
threats to national security.24 To the extent that they heard specific alle-
gations of abuse, most citizens regarded them with suspicion.2 5 To the
extent that they believed the allegations, most citizens accepted the gov-
ernment's claim that it needed extraordinary measures to protect the
country.26
Though the worst examples of mistreatment ceased after three
years, 27 accountability did not follow as a matter of course. The gov-
ernment remained in power; those most responsible for the extraordi-
nary measures received promotions and medals. 28 Yet things began to
change after the government launched a disastrous foreign war,2 9 in
which it alienated its closest allies30 and seriously misjudged the pros-
pects for quick victory.3' With its popular standing in decline for the
first time in six years, 32 the government soon witnessed its dream of
powerful executive rule collapse in the face of a resurgent judiciary
committed to accountability and the rule of law.33
If this story sounds familiar, it should: it recounts Argentina's prose-
cution of a Dirty War against terrorists from 1976 to 1979, and its
prosecution of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands War with the United
Kingdom in 1982. That the account also tracks the general contours of
the so-called "Global War on Terror" (GWOT) and the Iraq War should
be obvious. More interesting, and also less clear, is whether the com-
parison should provoke expressions of indignation or feelings of shame.
Those inclined to expressions of indignation may observe that the
comparison seems unfair: it succeeds only at the level of abstraction.
When one begins to examine details, the sense of congruity vanishes.
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The Argentine junta disappeared, tortured, and killed some ten thousand
or more individuals. 34 By contrast, the number of people recently sub-
jected to analogous treatment by U.S. personnel constitutes a fraction of
the atrocities committed during Argentina's Dirty War.35 According to
this view, the comparison to Argentina's Dirty War should provoke the
same righteous indignation expressed in 2005 when Amnesty Interna-
tional described Guantdnamo Bay as the "gulag of our times"36-an as-
sessment that then Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld described
as "reprehensible. 37
Those inclined to feelings of shame may notice that claims of right-
eous indignation tend only to reinforce the comparison to Argentina's
Dirty War. When observers drew parallels between the Argentine junta
and Nazi Germany,38 many responded that the atrocities committed by
Argentina represented a mere fraction of those perpetrated by the Third
Reich.39 In so doing, they relied on the power of factual accuracy, but
failed to recognize the limited utility of trying to draw distinctions be-
tween degrees of malevolence. 40 That the Argentine junta preyed on
fewer victims did not alter the vile character of its own transgressions;
that many rejected the comparison to National Socialism showed their
chilling lack of insight into a shared disregard for human dignity. One
might similarly indict those who rely on smaller body counts to reject
comparisons between the GWOT and Argentina's Dirty War.
For those who insist on comparisons that succeed on the level of de-
tail, one may identify two more paradigms against which to judge the
GWOT. First, during a three-year period, the Honduran government de-
tained some 100 to 150 individuals thought to endanger security, held
them in unregistered facilities, and subjected them to coercive interroga-
tion.41 When passing judgment in the Velcsquez Rodriguez case, the In-
ter-American Court of Human Rights implied that the "systematic" pat-
tern of disappearances under review might embody a crime against
humanity.42 Second, in the Akayesu case, the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for Rwanda held that forced nudity represents a form of "sexual
violence," which may constitute either a crime against humanity or a
war crime depending on the circumstances.43
The Velisquez Rodriguez case supplies the benchmark 44 against
which to judge the CIA's detention of some 100 individuals at secret
prisons around the world,45 the military's detention at one point of up to
100 unregistered "ghost detainees" in Iraq,46 and the "extraordinary ren-
dition" of some 100 to 150 individuals, 47 either literally abducted 48 or
released from official detention centers 49 and then surreptitiously trans-
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ported by U.S. aircraft for interrogation in countries known to practice
torture.50 Likewise, the Akayesu case provides a standard against which
to judge Secretary Rumsfeld's written authorization of forced nudity as
an interrogation technique at Guant~inamo Bay from December 2, 2002,
to January 15, 2003,51 and the subsequent determination by two U.S.
generals that sexual gambits, including forced public nudity before the
opposite sex and the smearing of fake menstrual blood on devout Mus-
lims, fell within the scope of approved interrogation tactics known as
"futility" or "ego down."
52
After discussing the Veldsquez Rodriguez and Akayesu cases, I re-
cently asked students to explain how the reported treatment of U.S. de-
tainees in Iraq and in the GWOT differs from conduct identified by two
international tribunals as possible crimes against humanity. One could
feel a palpable sense of shame envelop the classroom. Later, I asked a
respected international lawyer to explain how the unregistered detention
and coercive interrogation of U.S. detainees differs from practices made
famous in Argentina's Dirty War.53 Brimming with confidence, he re-
plied: "We are fighting to protect democracy." The disparity of re-
sponses evoked a sincere division of public opinion once held in Argen-
tina. It also posed a haunting question about how to describe our
country's future: will it be Nunca Miis or Dkjci Vu?
1. LAIN GUEST, BEHIND THE DISAPPEARANCES: ARGENTINA'S DIRTY WAR AGAINST HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS 13 (1990).
2. Ronald Dworkin, Introduction to ARG. NAT'L COMM'N ON THE DISAPPEARED, NUNCA
MAS, at xi (Farrar Straus Giroux 1986) [hereinafter NUNCA MAS]; see also Human Rights and the
Phenomenon of Disappearances: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Orgs. of the H. Comm.
on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong. 204 (1980) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Hon. Marvin E.
Frankel, Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights) (mentioning Argentina's "rich ma-
terial resources").
3. Dworkin, supra note 2, at xi; see also Hearings, supra note 2, at 204 (statement of Hon.
Marvin E. Frankel, Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights) (referring to "the enor-
mous potential offered by [Argentina's] vibrant people").
4. Hearings, supra note 2, at 95 (joint statement of David Hinkley, Chairman of Amnesty In-
ternational USA, and Patricia Weiss Fagen, Executive Committee of Amnesty International
USA); see also id. at 204 (statement of Hon. Marvin E. Frankel, Lawyers Committee for Interna-
tional Human Rights) (describing Argentina as "a nation with traditions ofjustice").
5. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 115 (statement of Tom Quigley, Adviser on Latin American
and Caribbean Affairs, U.S. Catholic Conference) (recognizing that "before the 1976 coup Argen-
tina was plagued by terrorist activities"); id. at 208 (statement of Hon. Marvin E. Frankel, Law-
yers Committee for International Human Rights) (recognizing that, in the mid-1970s, Argentina
"had been suffering.. from.. .widespread terrorist violence"); GUEST, supra note 1, at 17, 19-20
(referring to "a spate of spectacular bombings and killings in 1975 and 1976," describing "a long
series of provocative actions that held the country in thrall and helped to win the Montoneros a
reputation for ferocity throughout the Continent," and concluding that "[b]y the beginning of
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1976, left-wing terrorism [in Argentina] was sullen, brutal, and terrifying").
6. See NUNCA MAS, supra note 2, at 402 (observing that the Argentine junta committed dis-
appearances "under the pretext of guaranteeing national security"); MARK J. OSIEL, MASS
ATROCITY, ORDINARY EVIL, AND HANNAH ARENDT: CRIMINAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN
ARGENTINA'S DIRTY WAR 110 (2001) (recognizing the existence of works that portray the "na-
tional security doctrine" as "the guiding intellectual inspiration for policies like the Dirty War");
see also GUEST, supra note 1, at 21 (observing that the junta's members "were personally com-
mitted to the doctrine of national security").
7. See OSIEL, supra note 6, at 16 (describing the view of most Argentine officers that one
could not fight terrorists within the framework of the Geneva Conventions).
8. See id. at 76 ("General rules of positive law, formulated in advance of application, could
not grapple effectively with the ever-shifting operational necessities of fighting a counterrevolu-
tionary war where the enemy wore no uniform and the field of operations was not confined to any
identifiable battlefield."); id. at 114 (quoting junta member General Roberto Viola for the propo-
sition that "[tihis war, unlike classical war, does not have a determinate beginning nor a final bat-
tle at which the victor will be crowned"); see also Hearings, supra note 2, at 295 (statement of
Hon. Patricia M. Derian, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Af-
fairs) ("We are told that the disappearances.. .are the unavoidable byproduct of the 'war'
against... terrorism.").
9. See NUJNCA MAS, supra note 2, at 5 (noting that junta members "continue to repeat the old
excuses that they were engaged in a dirty war, or that they were saving the country and its West-
ern, Christian values"); OSIEL, supra note 6, at 56 (referring to the Argentine junta's repeated
invocation of the "imminent threat" that leftist guerrillas posed to "Western Civilization");
Dworkin, supra note 2, at xiii (discussing the military leadership's belief that "the terrorists of the
left were not just criminals to be pursued and punished by police action but a lethal and immanent
threat to Argentine civilization, an army of evil they had a duty to destroy in what they called a
'dirty war').
10. See GUEST, supra note 1, at 388 (noting that, at their trial, Junta members "maintained,
chillingly, that terrorism justified any and every response, no matter how cruel").
11. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 209-10 (statement of Hon. Marvin E. Frankel, Lawyers
Committee for International Human Rights) (quoting Argentine President General Jorge Videla
for the proposition that "[a] terrorist is not just someone with a gun or a bomb but also someone
who spreads ideas that are contrary to Western and Christian civilization"); AMNESTY INT'L
USA, DISAPPEARANCES: A WORKBOOK 10 (1981) (same); NUNCA MAS, supra note 2, at 333
(same); OSIEL, supra note 6, at 12 (same); see also GUEST, supra note 1, at 19 ("In retrospect it is
impossible to draw the line between active combatants and sympathizers.").
12. See OSIEL, supra note 6, at 77 ("As to the vast majority of detainees, the executive had no
evidence connecting them directly to revolutionary violence."); Dworkin, supra note 2, at xiv
("Very few of those who disappeared had any connection to the left-wing terrorist groups whose
activities provided the original excuse for the military coup."); Tina Rosenberg, Foreword to
MUNU ACTIS ET AL., THAT INFERNO: CONVERSATIONS OF FIVE WOMEN SURVIVORS OF AN
ARGENTINE TORTURE CAMP, at ix, xi (2006) (indicating that the "vast majority" of those who
were detained at the Navy Mechanics School "had never taken up a gun"); see also Hearings,
supra note 2, at 209 (statement of Hon. Marvin E. Frankel, Lawyers Committee for International
Human Rights) ("Without trials, evidentiary hearings, or any showings of probable cause, 'mis-
takes' were undoubtedly rife.").
13. See OSIEL, supra note 6, at 54 (quoting an Argentine officer for the proposition that "[w]e
knew if we put [terrorists] into the courts, they would ask for all the guarantees of the system they
were attacking").
14. See Cable from the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires to the Secretary of State on "The Tac-
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tic of Disappearance" (Sept. 1980), reprinted in GUEST, supra note 1, at 430, 433 ("The military
are unwilling to use civilian courts to punish active terrorists. They argue that the courts would
simply let the terrorists go."); see also GUEST, supra note 1, at 26 (describing the collapse of ju-
dicial guarantees during Argentina's Dirty War); NUNCA MAS, supra note 2, at 386-87, 396-97
(same); OSIEL, supra note 6, at 78 (same).
15. NUNCA MAS, supra note 2, at 20.
16. Id. at 35, 42-44; Dworkin, supra note 2, at xvi.
17. GUEST, supra note 1, at 40-41; NUNCA MAS, supra note 2, at 27, 34, 36-39, 43-49, 138,
143-45, 174, 196, 241, 409; Dworkin, supra note 2, at xvi.
18. During Argentina's Dirty War, the armed forces developed a practice of "transferring"
disappeared prisoners, which entailed administering sedatives to prisoners, loading them onto
aircraft, and throwing them, alive, into the sea. ACTIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 17-19; GUEST,
supra note 1, at 42; NUNCA MAS, supra note 2, at 221-22; see also Press Release, Amnesty Int'l,
Amnesty Int'l Publishes Testimony of Survivors from Secret Detention Camps in Arg. (Feb. 4,
1980), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 2, at 625, 627.
19. See GUEST, supra note 1, at 32 ("What made the dirty war different.. .was the scale and
method. Never before had the.. resources of [the] state been geared to systematic torture and
murder. The Junta turned disappearances into a government policy... as deliberate, methodical,
and calculated as collecting tax, [which was] very much out of character with the haphazard bru-
tality of previous military regimes.").
20. See Rosenberg, supra note 12, at ix, xi (describing the Mechanics School of the Argentine
Navy (ESMA) as a "torture chamber that became the most notorious in Latin America's history,"
and indicating that some 4,000 to 4,500 individuals perished there during Argentina's Dirty War);
see also ACTIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 28 (Elisa Tokar) ("When I fell, during the torture, they
asked me, 'From what you know or what you've heard, where would you least like to be?' I said,
'In the ESMA.' And they replied, 'You are in the ESMA."'); GUEST, supra note 1, at 37 (describ-
ing the ESMA as "the navy's nerve center in the war against subversion," which "would claim the
lives of almost 5,000 Argentinians").
21. NUNCA MAS, supra note 2, at 363.
22. Id. ("On 24 March 1976, the Junta of the Commanders-in-Chief let it be know in their
communiqu6 No. 19 that 'anyone who by any means emits, spreads or propagates news, commu-
niqurs or images with a view to upsetting, prejudicing, or demeaning the activity of the Armed,
Security, or Police Forces, will be liable to a punishment of up to ten years in prison."').
23. See GUEST, supra note 1, at 84 ("The Foreign Ministry would charge Amnesty with ac-
cepting questionable allegations, but this ignored the fact that the policy of disappearances was
designed to ensure that hard information was not available.").
24. NUNCA MAS, supra note 2, at 364.
25. Id.; see also ACTIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 28 (Elisa Tokar) ("I heard rumors about what
was happening, but I said, 'That much perversion just can't be real."'); id. at 29 (Liliana Gardella)
("We were in denial about what was going on.").
26. OSIEL, supra note 6, at 14, 82; Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Report of the Mission
of Lawtyers to Argentina April 1-7, 1979, reprinted in Hearings, supra note 2, at 446, 462;
Dworkin, supra note 2, at xiv-xv.
27. Dworkin, supra note 2, at xi, xv (indicating that Argentina's Dirty War began in 1976, but
that "[a]fter 1979.. .the disappearances largely ceased"); see also GUEST, supra note 1, at 179
(opining that "the disappearances tailed off in the last quarter of 1979").
28. See ACTIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 145 (Miriam Lewin) (mentioning that Admiral Emilio
Massera "decorated those who had fought" in Argentina's Dirty War); OSIEL, supra note 6, at 58
(describing the promotions later conferred on Alfredo Astiz, one of the Dirty War's most notori-
ous figures); id at 82-83 ("Even after the juntas had been tried and convicted, and the crimes of
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their subordinates became common knowledge to all Argentines, several officers were able to win
public office (or, at least, many thousands of civilian votes) in elections."); see also GUEST, supra
note 1, at 399-400 (describing how, after the Falkland/Malvinas Islands War, Astiz returned from
British captivity "like a hero," "was awarded a medal," and "resumed working for the navy intel-
ligence").
29. GUEST, supra note 1, at 3, 335; OSIEL, supra note 6, at 15; Dworkin, supra note 2, at xv.
30. See GUEST, supra note 1, at 341 (observing that, in the Falkland/Malvinas Islands War,
Argentina "had forced the United States to choose between its closest European ally and [Argen-
tina]").
31. GUEST, supra note 1, at 337; Dworkin, supra note 2, at xv.
32. See GUEST, supra note 1, at 345 ("Following the Falklands/Malvinas war, all the emotion
that had been bottled up through six long years of military rule exploded....").
33. See id. at 335 ("Within three months [of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands War], the Junta's
dream of indefinite military rule would be shattered."); see also id. at 386-91 (describing the
1985 trial and conviction of five junta members, and quoting a cable in which U.S. Ambassador
Frank Ortiz described the outcome as a "dramatic demonstration... of judicial independence in
democratic Argentina"); OSIEL, supra note 6, at 16 (describing the trial and conviction of five
junta members in December 1985).
34. Hearings, supra note 2, at 43-44 (statement of Jerome J. Shestack, President, Interna-
tional League for Human Rights); id. at 351 (statement of Orville H. Schell, Lawyers Committee
for International Human Rights); GUEST, supra note 1, at 3, 30, 32, 384; NUNCA MAS, supra note
2, at 5, 10, 284; OSIEL, supra note 6, at 1, 13; Dworkin, supra note 2, at xi.
35. Cf Hearings, supra note 2, at 114 (statement of Tom Quigley, Adviser on Latin Ameri-
can and Caribbean Affairs, U.S. Catholic Conference) ("Obviously disappearance as a policy of
political repression is of a different order in Argentina than anywhere else."); id. at 43 (statement
of Jerome J. Shestack, President, International League for Human Rights) (describing Argentina's
Dirty War as "the most shocking and disturbing" example of disappearances); id. at 386 (state-
ment of Chauncey Alexander, Chairman, Council on Hemispheric Affairs and Executive Direc-
tor, National Association of Social Workers) (describing Argentina as "probably 'the' worst vio-
lator [of human rights] in South America").
36. ALFRED W. MCCOY, A QUESTION OF TORTURE 179 (2006); Lizette Alvarez, Rights
Group Defends Chastising of U.S., N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2005, at A5; Editorial, "American Gu-
lag," WASH. POST, May 26, 2005, at A26; Kenneth Anderson, An American Gulag?, WKLY.
STANDARD, June 13, 2005, at 11; Dan Eggen & Josh White, Inmates Alleged Koran Abuse,
WASH. POST, May 26, 2005, at Al; Cragg Hines, Gulag? No. Unnecessary Geopolitical Pain?
You Bet., HOUS. CHRON., June 8, 2005, at B9; Dana Milbank, An Administration's Amnesty Am-
nesia, WASH. POST, June 5, 2005, at A4; Michael O'Hanlon, Amnesty Astray, WASH. TIMES,
June 6, 2005, at A20; Robert Scheer, Commentary, L.A. TIMES, June 7, 2005, at 13; Demetri Se-
vastopulo, Rumsfeld Joins Attack on Amnesty "Gulag" Claims, FIN. TIMES, June 1, 2005, avail-
able at http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?newsid=fto06O120050080001204.
37. Sources cited supra note 36. President Bush characterized Amnesty's choice of words as
"absurd." Id. Vice President Cheney claimed that the words "offended" him. Sources cited supra
note 36. Describing it as an "infuriating," "counterproductive," "outrageous," and "ludicrous"
exaggeration, even prominent critics of the Bush Administration joined in condemning Am-
nesty's comparison of Guantdnamo to the Soviet gulag. See, e.g., Anne Applebaum, Editorial,
Amnesty's Amnesia, WASH. POST, June 8, 2005, at A21, available at 2005 WLNR 9076716
(chastising Amnesty for its "infuriating" misuse of language); E.J. Dionne, Jr., Hyperbole and
Human Rights, WASH. POST, June 3, 2005, at A23 (lamenting the "maddening" use of the "outra-
geous gulag metaphor"); O'Hanlon, supra note 36 (denouncing Amnesty for its "counterproduc-
tive" and "egregiously ludicrous exaggeration"); see also Alvarez, supra note 36 ("1 think it was a
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rather serious misjudgment to use the term gulag.... [I]t has given the administration the opportu-
nity to divert from the substance of the concern.") (quoting Sir Nigel Rodley, formerly Amnesty's
legal adviser and U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture), "American Gulag," supra note 36 (com-
plaining that Amnesty had lost "its bearings" and gave "the administration another excuse to dis-
miss valid objections to its policies as 'hysterical"').
Shortly after Amnesty's controversial use of the "gulag" metaphor, Senator Richard J. Durbin
(D.-Ill.) compared the treatment of detainees at Guantadnamo Bay to the repressive practices of the
Nazi and Khmer Rouge regimes. Apology Demanded for Remark on U.S., N.Y. TIMES, June 17,
2005, at A18. Leading Republicans demanded an apology. Id.
38. See ACTIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 284 ("The prisoners of the ESMA experienced first-
hand the similarities between the procedures and conduct of the Nazis during World War II and
the Argentine Navy during the military dictatorship."); GUEST, supra note 1, at 282 ("Again and
again the parallel was drawn between Argentina and Nazi Germany."); id. at 32 ("Historically,
the nearest equivalent to [Argentina's] disappearances were the Night and Fog decrees used by
the Nazis to remove several hundred members of the Resistance and sow terror in Nazi-occupied
Europe.").
39. See GUEST, supra note 1, at 288 (explaining that most people regarded the comparison of
Argentina to Nazi Germany as an exaggeration).
40. See J.M. COETZEE, THE LIVES OF ANIMALS 44 (2001) (involving a scene in which the
main character rejects a distinction between two potentially objectionable practices because they
merely represent "[d]egrees of obscenity").
41. Veldsquez Rodriguez Case, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, at 121-23, 127, 140-
42 (July 29, 1988), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 291 (1989).
42. Although the Inter-American Court did not expressly hold that Honduran officials had
perpetrated a crime against humanity, it recognized that "[i]nternational practice and doctrine
have often categorized disappearances as a crime against humanity." Id. at 146. Furthermore, the
court emphasized that Honduran officials had performed disappearances on a "systematic" basis,
a finding typically required to establish liability for crimes against humanity. Id. at 141; see also
ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 64, 80 (2003) (indicating that crimes
against humanity "are not isolated or sporadic events," but involve "a widespread or systematic"
perpetration of atrocities, such as enforced disappearances); STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S.
ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 57, 74
(1997) (emphasizing that crimes against humanity involve the perpetration of atrocities, such as
disappearances, on a large scale or in a "systematic manner"). Thus, by emphasizing the system-
atic nature of disappearances in Honduras, the Inter-American Court implied that they represented
a crime against humanity.
Subsequent treaties and declarations have affirmed that the systematic perpetration of disap-
pearances constitutes a crime against humanity. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court art. 7(1)(i), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (defining crimes against humanity to
include "[e]nforced disappearance of persons" when "committed as part of a widespread or sys-
tematic attack directed against any civilian population"); Inter-American Convention on the
Forced Disappearance of Persons pmbl., 6, June 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1529 (1994)
("REAFFIRMING that the systematic practice of the forced disappearance of persons constitutes
a crime against humanity"); Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disap-
pearance, G.A. Res. 47/133, pmbl., 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/133 (Dec. 18, 1992) ("Considering
that enforced disappearance undermines the deepest values of any society committed to respect
for the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and that the systematic practice of
such acts is of the nature of a crime against humanity"); NIGEL S. RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF
PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 267 (2d ed. 1999) ("The 1990s have seen a rapid evo-
lution of the notion of 'disappearances' [as] constituting a crime against humanity.").
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Although the disappearances in Honduras usually entailed torture and ended in murder, the In-
ter-American Court regarded the "mere subjection of an individual to prolonged isolation and
deprivation of communication... itself [as] cruel and inhuman treatment." Velisquez Rodriguez
Case, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4 at 148-49, 159; Human Rights Watch, The United
States' "Disappeared": The CIA 's Long-Term "Ghost Detainees, " at 10 (Oct. 2004), available at
http://hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/us 1004/usI 004.pdf; see also Human Rights First, Ending Secret
Detentions, at 20 (June 2004), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us-law/PDF/
EndingSecretDetentions-web.pdf (noting that "incommunicado detention, especially by denying
individuals contact with family and friends, violates the ICCPR's obligation to treat prisoners
with humanity"); Josh White, Prisoner Accounts Suggest Detention at Secret Facilities, WASH.
POST, Nov. 7, 2005, at All (quoting Manfred Nowak, the U.N. Rapporteur on Torture, for the
proposition that "[i]ncommunicado detention forms inhumane treatment in and of itself"). Consis-
tent with the Inter-American Court's holding, modem judicial decisions and legal instruments
define disappearances merely as the abduction of individuals followed by the state's refusal to
acknowledge the abduction or disclose the person's fate or whereabouts. See Forti v. Suarez-
Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 711 (N.D. Cal. 1988); see also Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, supra, art. 7(2)(i); Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of
Persons, supra, art. II; Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappear-
ance, supra, pmbl., 1 3.
Also consistent with the Inter-American Court's holding in Veldsquez Rodriguez, experiments
have shown that isolation and sensory deprivation by themselves cause profound psychological
disturbances, including frightening hallucinations. McCoy, supra note 36, at 33-40; PHYSICIANS
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BREAK THEM DOWN: SYSTEMATIC USE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TORTURE BY
US FORCES 59-66 (2005), available at http://www.physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/
documents/reports/break-them-down-the.pdf; see also Amnesty Int'l, United States of Amer-
ica/Yemen: Secret Detention in CIA "Black Sites," at 14 (Nov. 2005), Al Index AMR
51/177/2005, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/AMR511772005ENGLISH/$File/
AMR5117705.pdf. One study even concluded that "the effect of isolation on the brain function of
the prisoner is much like that which occurs if he is beaten, starved, or deprived of sleep."
MCCOY, supra note 36, at 33. This corresponds to the experience of one of Argentina's disap-
peared, who stated that "[t]he psychological torture of the 'hood' was as bad or worse than the
physical, although the two cannot be compared since whereas the latter attempts to reach the lim-
its of pain, the hood causes despair, anxiety and madness." NUNCA MAS, supra note 2, at 57. The
hood became so unbearable for that person that he begged to be "transferred," a process synony-
mous with death. Id.; see also supra note 18 (discussing the practice of "transferring" in Argen-
tina's Dirty War).
Both the International Committee for the Red Cross and the F.B.I. have described the extreme
psychological trauma exhibited by U.S. detainees subjected to sensory deprivation and extended
periods of isolation. MCCOY, supra note 36, at 158; PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra, at
66-68.
43. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, 429, 688 (Sept. 2, 1998)
(defining sexual violence to include coercive acts of a sexual nature not involving a physical in-
vasion, ruling that the undressing of a female student and forcing her to perform gymnastics in a
public courtyard constituted a form of sexual violence, and holding that such conduct violated
both Article 3 (crimes against humanity) and Article 4 (war crimes) of the tribunal's statute).
Similarly, the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has held that stripping female
prisoners and forcing them to stand or dance on tables represents an "outrage upon personal dig-
nity" constituting a war crime. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/I-T,
Judgment, 19 9, 766-74, 782 (Feb. 22, 2001); see also Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-
30/l-T, Judgment, 99 170, 180, 190 (Nov. 2, 2001) (reciting precedent to support the proposition
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that "sexual violence, including forced public nudity, cause[s] severe physical or mental pain and
amount[s] to outrages upon personal dignity" and that "rape and forced nudity are recognized as
crimes against humanity"); KNUT DORMANN, ELEMENTS OF WAR CRIMES UNDER THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 331 (2003) (indicating that "forced nudity"
falls within the scope of war crimes involving sexual violence).
According to one source who regularly works with victims of sexual violence, victims would
prefer physical beatings to sexual abuse. PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 42, at 56.
Thus, only those unfamiliar with the law and the psychological effects of sexual violence would
compare forced nudity to something as "innocuous" as "locker-room nudity." Id. at 57. But see
David Remnick, Hearts and Minds, NEW YORKER, May 17, 2004, at 27 ("This is no different
than what happens at the Skull and Bones initiation....") (quoting Rush Limbaugh).
44. Echoing the Inter-American Court's judgment in Velisquez Rodriguez, the United Na-
tions Special Rapporteur on Torture stated that "if reports of the C.I.A.'s activities proved correct,
then the agency was engaged in a 'systematic practice of enforced disappearance."' Stephen Grey
& Renwick McLean, Spain Looks into C.I.A. 's Handling of Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14,
2005, at AS.
45. JAMES RISEN, STATE OF WAR: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE CIA AND THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION 35 (2006); Coming Clean, ECONOMIST, Sept. 9, 2006, at 33; Ian Fisher, Rights
Group Lists 26 It Says U.S. Is Holding in Secret Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2005, at A6; Dafna
Linzer & Glenn Kessler, Decision to Move Detainees Resolved Two-Year Debate Among Bush
Advisers, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2006, at Al; Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret
Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at Al [hereinafter Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Se-
cret Prisons]; Editorial, The Prison Puzzle, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2005, at A26; Editorial, Rebel-
lion Against Abuse, WASH. POST., Nov. 3, 2005, at A20; Scott Shane, The Question of Liability
Stirs Concern at the CIA, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2006, at A12; R. Jeffrey Smith, McCain Names
Practices Detainee Bill Would Bar, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2006, at A5; R. Jeffrey Smith & Mi-
chael Fletcher, Bush Says Detainees Will Be Tried, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2006, at Al; Sheryl Gay
Stolberg, President Moves 14 Held in Secret to Guantinamo: Seeks Tribunals, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
7, 2006, at Al. This figure represents the total number of people, not picked up in Iraq, who
passed through secret CIA detention centers. Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons,
supra.
Until recently, reports consistently stated that the CIA maintained long-term custody of ap-
proximately two to three dozen high-value detainees. MCCOY, supra note 36, at 116-17; Am-
nesty Int'l, supra note 42, at 4; Douglas Jehl, C.IA. Is Seen as Seeking New Role on Detainees,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2005, at A16; Douglas Jehl, Qaeda-Iraq Link U.S. Cited Is Tied to Coercion
Claim, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2005, at Al [hereinafter Jehl, Qaeda-Iraq Link]; Douglas Jehl, Senate
Intelligence Chairman Opposes C.I.A. Abuse Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2005, at A7; Douglas
Jehl, Senate Is Set To Require White House To Account for Secret Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15,
2005, at A25; David Johnston & Neil A. Lewis, Officials Describe Secret C.I.A. Center at Guan-
tanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2004, at A15; Neil A. Lewis & Mark Mazzetti, Lawyers Weighing
Suits Over CIA 's Secret Jails, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2006, at A20; Priest, CIA Holds Terror Sus-
pects in Secret Prisons, supra; Dana Priest, Senate Urged to Probe CIA Practices, WASH. POST,
Apr. 22, 2005, at A2 [hereinafter Priest, Senate Urged to Probe CIA Practices]; Dana Priest &
Scott Higham, At Guantanamo, a Prison Within a Prison, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2004, at Al;
Dana Priest & Josh White, Policies on Terrorism Suspects Come Under Fire, WASH. POST, Nov.
3, 2005, at A2; Katherine Shrader, Terror War Detainees Total Passes 83,000; Some Held for
Years, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 16, 2005; Steven R. Weisman, US. Rebuffs Red Cross Request
for Access to Detainees Held in Secret, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2005, at A10; Kate Zemike, Ad-
ministration Prods Congress To Curb the Rights of Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2006, at Al.
Thus, of the roughly 100 people who entered its secret detention centers, the CIA apparently re-
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tained custody of the highest-value prisoners and eventually transferred the lower-value prisoners
to the custody of third states. Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, supra; The
Prison Puzzle, supra.
On September 6, 2006, President Bush "reappeared" fourteen individuals held at secret CIA
detention centers, transferred them into official custody at Guantinamo Bay, and called for their
prosecution before military commissions. George W. Bush, U.S. President, President Bush Deliv-
ers Remarks on Terrorism (Sept. 6, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.washingtonpost
.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/06/AR2006090601425.html) [hereinafter Bush Delivers
Remarks on Terrorism]; see Coming Clean, supra; David E. Sanger, President Moves 14 Held in
Secret to Guant6namo: For Congress, 2 Votes Loom, N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 2006, at A l; Smith &
Fletcher, supra; Stolberg, supra.
While indicating that no prisoners remained in secret CIA detention centers after September 6,
2006, the Bush administration stated that the sites should continue to play an important role in the
GWOT. Bush Delivers Remarks on Terrorism, supra; see Dana Priest, Officials Relieved Secret
Is Shared, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2006, at A17; Eugene Robinson, Editorial, "Values" We Have to
Hide Abroad, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2006, at A17; Jim Rutenberg & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bush
Says G.O.P. Rebels Are Putting Nation at Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2006, at A12; Jonathan
Weisman, GOP Leaders Back Bush on Wiretapping, Tribunals, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2006, at
A13; see Editorial, Ending the Lawlessness, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2006, at A26 (noting President
Bush's insistence "that the CIA's program of secret detentions and coercive interrogations needs
to continue"); Shane, supra ("Mr. Bush has defended the interrogation program and has said it
should not be disbanded....").
A week after transferring the fourteen inmates to Guantbnamo, President Bush made an im-
passioned plea for Congress to enact the legislation needed to ensure that the CIA "program"
could "go forward." Bush Delivers Remarks on Terrorism, supra; see Charles Babington & Jona-
than Weisman, Senators Defy Bush on Terror Measure, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2006, at A l; Peter
Baker, GOP Infighting on Detainees Intensifies, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 2006, at Al; Editorial, A
License to Abuse, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2006, at B6; Rutenberg & Stolberg, supra; see also Edi-
torial, A Defining Moment for America, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2006, at A 18; Editorial, Stamped-
ing Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2006, at A24; Kate Zernike, Rebuff for Bush on How to
Treat Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2006, at A1.
Two weeks after President Bush made his impassioned plea, Congress adopted legislation to
satisfy his demands. See Charles Babington, House Approves Bill on Detainees, WASH. POST,
Sept. 28, 2006, at Al; Charles Babington & Jonathan Weisman, Senate Approves Detainee Bill
Backed by Bush, WASH. POST, Sept, 29, 2006, at Al; Carl Hulse & Kate Zernike, House Passes
Detainee Bill as It Clears Senate Hurdle, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2006, at A20. In so doing, Con-
gress seems to have forgotten the words of House Concurrent Resolution 285, adopted on March
10, 1980, by a vote of 343 to 3. In that document, the House of Representatives warned that "any
government which causes the disappearance of any person by the abduction and clandestine de-
tention of that person is committing an act of terrorism which cannot be justified under any cir-
cumstances." H.R. Con. Res. 285, 96th Cong. (1980), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 2, at viii,
632 (emphasis added).
46. According to congressional testimony by Army General Paul J. Kern, U.S. armed forces
held "perhaps up to 100" unregistered detainees in Iraq at the CIA's behest. Tom Bowman, More
Iraqis Hidden from Red Cross, Army Finds CIA Kept up to 100 Detainees at Abu Ghraib off
Prison Rolls, Spy Agency Shuts out Investigators, BALT. SUN, Sept. 10, 2004, at IA; Dossier: An
Ounce of Detention, AM. PROSPECT, Nov. 1, 2005, at 7; Bradley Graham & Josh White, General
Cites Hidden Detainees, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2004, at A24; Ken Guggenheim, Generals Say
Abu Ghraib May Have Had Two Dozen "Ghost Detainees," CHI. SUN TIMES, Sept. 10, 2004;
John Hendren, CIA May Have Held 100 "Ghost" Prisoners, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2004, at 1;
536 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 47:2
Iraq Digest, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 10, 2004, at A18; Jonathan S. Landay & Sumana Chatterjee,
Probe Finds CIA Had Dozens of "Ghost" Inmates, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 10, 2004, at A10;
Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14 & 21, 2005, at 106, 108; Dana Priest,
Detainee Shift Enabled by Justice Memo, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 24, 2004, at Al; Eric
Schmitt & Douglas Jehl, Army Says C.I.A. Hid More Iraqis Than It Claimed, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
10, 2004, at Al; Tom Squitieri, CIA Hid Many Iraqi Prisoners, Generals Say as Many as 100
"Ghost Detainees," USA TODAY, Sept. 10, 2004, at 10A; Guy Taylor, "Ghost Detainees " Num-
ber up to 100, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2004, at A5; see also Josh White, Army, CIA Agreed on
"Ghost" Prisoners, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2005, at A16 [hereinafter White, Army, CIA Agreed
on "Ghost" Prisoners].
In the executive summary of his report on interrogation operations, Vice Admiral Albert T.
Church III indicated that the U.S. military had held approximately thirty "ghost detainees" in Iraq.
Albert T. Church Ill, DoD Presents Findings of Church Report, at 18 (Mar. 10, 2005),
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050310exe.pdf; see also PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 42, at 33; White, Army, CIA Agreed on "Ghost" Prisoners, supra; Josh
White, Army Documents Shed Light on CIA "Ghosting, " WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 2005, at A15.
Army Major General George Fay provided a similar estimate: somewhere "in the area of two
dozen or so-maybe more." Bowman, supra; Graham & White, supra; Guggenheim, supra; Lan-
day & Chattejee, supra; see also Schmitt & Jehl, supra.
While not hazarding a numerical estimate, another Army investigator, Major General Antonio
Taguba, observed that the detention facilities operated by the 800th Military Police Brigade "rou-
tinely" held ghost detainees for the CIA. Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba, Article 15-6 Investiga-
tion of the 800th Military Police Brigade, at 26-27 (2004), http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/
prison abuse-report.pdf. Likewise, the "second in command of the intelligence gathering effort at
Abu Ghraib... told military investigators" that the CIA and special forces "routinely" brought
ghost detainees to his facilities. White, Army, CIA Agreed on "Ghost" Prisoners, supra.
Former Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld personally ordered the unregistered deten-
tion of at least one Iraqi at the request of then CIA Director George Tenet. See James R.
Schlesinger et al., Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review Department of Defense De-
tention Operations, reprinted in THE ABU GHRAIB INVESTIGATIONS 1, 95 (Steven Strasser ed.,
2004) [hereinafter Schlesinger Report]; Human Rights Watch, supra note 42, at 5; see also Bow-
man, supra; Editorial, A Failure ofAccountability, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 2004, at B6; Fanning
the Flames, ECONOMIST, June 26, 2004, at 33; Graham & White, supra; Hendren, supra; Iraq
Digest, supra; Douglas Jehl, U.S. Rules on Prisoners Seen as a Back and Forth of Mixed Mes-
sages to G.I. 's, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2004, at A7; Mayer, supra, at 108; Blake Morrison & John
Diamond, Pressure at Iraqi Prison Detailed, USA TODAY, June 18, 2004, at IA; Dana Priest &
Bradley Graham, U.S. Struggled Over How Far to Push Tactics, WASH. POST, June 24, 2004, at
A l ; Dana Priest & Josh White, Detainee Reportedly Was Lost in System, WASH. POST, June 17,
2004, at A19; Schmitt & Jehl, supra; Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, Rumsfeld Issued an Order
To Hide Detainee in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2004, at Al; Thom Shanker & Andrea Elliott,
Rumsfeld Admits He Told Jailers To Keep Detainee in Iraq out of Red Cross View, N.Y. TIMES,
June 18, 2004, at A10; Editorial, Torture Policy (cont'd), WASH. POST, June 21, 2004, at A18.
47. MCCOY, supra note 36, at 117, 124; Daniel Byman, Op-Ed, Reject the Abuses, Retain the
Tactic, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 2005, at B1; Dossier: An Ounce of Detention, supra note 46; Ian
Fisher, Reports of Secret U.S. Prisons in Europe Draw Ire and Otherwise Red Faces, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 1, 2005, at A14; Grey & McLean, supra note 44; Stephen Grey & Don Van Natta,
Jr., Italy Judge Orders the Arrest of 13 CIA Agents, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 25, 2005, at 1;
Jehl, Qaeda-Iraq Link, supra note 45; Douglas Jehl & David Johnston, Rule Change Lets C.I.A.
Freely Send Suspects Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, at 1; Mayer, supra note 46, at 107;
Dana Priest, Senate Urged to Probe CIA Practices, supra note 45; Report Rendered, ECONOMIST,
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June 10, 2006, at 49; Jan Sliva, EU Lawmakers Say CIA Conducted 1,000 Secret Flights Over
Europe, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 27, 2006, at A16 [hereinafter Sliva, EULawmakers Say CIA Con-
ducted 1,000 Secret Flights]; Craig S. Smith & Souad Mekhennet, Algerian Tells of Dark Odys-
sey in U.S. Hands, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2006, at 1; Editorial, Torture by Proxy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
8, 2005, at 22; Don Van Natta, Jr., U.S. Recruits a Rough Ally to Be a Jailer, N.Y. TIMES, May 1,
2005, at 1; see also Jan Sliva, Swiss Investigator Says U.S. "Outsourced" Torture-and Euro-
pean Countries Likely Knew, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 24, 2006 [hereinafter Sliva, Swiss Investi-
gator Says US. "Outsourced" Torture].
According to one source, the "CIA inspector general is investigating a growing number of
what it calls 'erroneous renditions,"' said by one official to include about "three dozen names."
Dana Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment: Anatomy of a CIA Mistake, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2005, at
A l; see also Byman, supra ("[Tlhe United States will at times inevitably render the wrong peo-
ple."); Bob Herbert, Editorial, Torture, American Style, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2005, at A25
("There is a widespread but mistaken notion in the U.S. that everybody seized by the government
in its so-called war on terror is in fact somehow connected to terrorist activity. That is just wildly
wrong."); Editorial, Self-Inflicted Wounds, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2005, at A18 ("Report after re-
port shows that a vast majority of those swept up in American anti-terrorism campaigns were in-
nocent."); Jan Sliva, CIA Carried Out More Than 1,000 Secret Flights Over Europe, EU Law-
makers Say, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 26, 2006 ("[M]istakes had been made and were being
investigated by the CIA's inspector general.").
Despite the unsettling error rate, top U.S. officials have defended the use of "extraordinary
renditions." See Grey & Van Natta, supra (noting that "senior officials have defended the prac-
tice... as a legal way to thwart terrorist activities"); Jehl, Qaeda-Iraq Link, supra note 45 (observ-
ing that "American officials including Ms. Rice have defended [extraordinary rendition], saying
it... provides an important tool for interrogation"); Glenn Kessler, Rice Defends Tactics Used
Against Suspects, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2005, at Al (reporting Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice's description of renditions as a "vital tool" that "save[s] lives" by taking terrorists "out of
action"); Dana Priest & Walter Pincus, CIA, White House Defend Transfers of Terror Suspects,
WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2005, at A7 (reporting that "[t]he CIA and the White House yesterday de-
fended the practice of secretly transferring suspected terrorists to other countries"); Self-Inflicted
Wounds, supra (indicating that the "new attorney general, Alberto Gonzales, defended [extraordi-
nary rendition] in his recent confirmation hearings in the Senate"); R. Jeffery Smith, Gonzales
Defends Transfer of Detainees, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2005, at A3 ("Attorney General Alberto R.
Gonzales [has] defended the practice of 'extraordinary rendition."'); see also Michael Scheuer,
Editorial, A Fine Rendition, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2005, A23 (expressing the view of a former
CIA employee that the rendition program operated with approval of the Justice Department, the
National Security Council, and President George W. Bush); Craig Whitlock, Europeans Investi-
gate CIA Role in Abductions, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2005, at Al ("The CIA has.. defended the
controversial practice as an effective and legal way to prevent terrorism.").
48. For example, in February 2003, a CIA team in Milan, Italy, sprayed chemicals into the
face of radical Muslim cleric Abu Omar (also known as Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr), packed
him into a van, brought him to Aviano airbase, loaded him onto a plane, and flew him via Ger-
many to Egypt, where he experienced fourteen months of torture. Amnesty Int'l,
USA/Jordan/Yemen: Torture and Secret Detention 15, Al Index AMR 51/108/2005, Aug. 4,
2005, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/AMR511082005ENGLISH/$File/AMR
5110805.pdf [hereinafter USA/Jordan/Yemen: Torture and Secret Detention]; see MCCOY, supra
note 36, at 174-75; Fisher, supra note 47; Sliva, Swiss Investigator Says U.S. "Outsourced" Tor-
ture, supra note 47; Phil Stewart, Italian Govt Rebuffs Pressure in CIA Kidnap Case, REUTERS
NEWS, Mar. 2, 2006; Whitlock, supra note 47; see also John Crewdson et al., Italy Charges CIA
Agents, Chi. Trib., June 25, 2005, § 1, at 1; Tom Hundley & John Crewdson, Italy Wants Alleged
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CIA Plotters Extradited, Chi. Trib., June 29, 2005, § 1, at 4; Craig Whitlock, CIA Ruse Is Said to
Have Damaged Probe in Milan, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2005, at Al [hereinafter Whitlock, CIA
Ruse]; Craig Whitlock & Dafna Linzer, Italy Seeks Arrest of 13 in Alleged CIA Action, WASH.
POST, June 25, 2005, at Al; Tracy Wilkinson, CIA Said To Leave Trail in Abduction, L.A. TIMES,
June 26, 2005, at A3 [hereinafter Wilkinson, CIA Said To Leave Trail in Abduction].
Abu Omar's fate became public knowledge in mid-2004, when-duing a brief period of re-
lease-he placed a call from Egypt to his wife's telephone in Italy, where a wiretap by Italian au-
thorities recorded the conversation. USA/Jordan/Yemen: Torture and Secret Detention, supra, at
15; Crewdson et al., supra; Whitlock, CIA Ruse, supra; Whitlock, supra note 47; Craig Whitlock,
Italy Seeks Extradition of 22 CIA Operatives, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 2005, at A19 [hereinafter
Whitlock, Italy Seeks Extradition]; Whitlock & Linzer, supra; Tracy Wilkinson, Italy Seeks For-
mer U.S. Diplomat in Kidnapping, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2005, at Al [hereinafter Wilkinson, It-
aly Seeks Former U.S. Diplomat in Kidnapping]; see also Wilkinson, CIA Said To Leave Trail in
Abduction, supra (noting that "during a brief period of freedom in 2004," Abu Omar "told associ-
ates that he was tortured with electrical shocks to his genitals and beatings"). Shortly thereafter,
Egyptian authorities reportedly rearrested Abu Omar. USA/Jordan/Yemen: Torture and Secret
Detention, supra, at 15; Whitlock, CIA Ruse, supra; Whitlock, supra note 47. He remains in cus-
tody without charges. USA/Jordan/Yemen: Torture and Secret Detention, supra, at 15; Wilkinson,
Italy Seeks Former U.S. Diplomat in Kidnapping, supra; see also Account Rendered,
ECONOMIST, July 22, 2006, at 50 (reporting that Abu Omar's "lawyer says that he is in Cairo's al-
Tora prison, where he has been repeatedly tortured, and has three times attempted suicide").
In June 2005, an Italian judge ordered the arrest of thirteen U.S. citizens believed to work for
the CIA and to have participated in the kidnapping of Abu Omar. USA/Jordan/Yemen: Torture
and Secret Detention, supra, at 15; Sophie Arie, Europe, US Clash over Terror War, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, June 29, 2005, at 6; Crewdson et al., supra; Grey & Van Natta, supra note 47;
Hundley & Crewdson, supra; Whitlock & Linzer, supra; Wilkinson, CIA Said To Leave Trail in
Abduction, supra. By late 2005, Italian officials had issued nine more warrants for the arrest of
U.S. citizens, bringing the total to twenty-two. Grey & McLean, supra note 44; Fisher, supra note
47; Whitlock, CIA Ruse, supra; Craig Whitlock, Europeans Probe Secret CIA Flights, WASH.
POST, Nov. 17, 2005, at A22 [hereinafter Whitlock, Europeans Probe Secret CIA Flights];
Whitlock, Italy Seeks Extradition, supra; Tracy Wilkinson, Europe in Uproar Over CIA Opera-
tions, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2005, at Al; Wilkinson, Italy Seeks Former U.S. Diplomat in Kid-
napping, supra. In addition, Italian police arrested two Italian intelligence officers alleged to have
played a role in the kidnapping. Jim Hoagland, Op-Ed, Bush's Unintended Internationalism,
WASH. POST, July 9, 2006, at B7; Smith & Mekhennet, supra note 47; Craig Whitlock, Prosecu-
tors: Italian Agency Helped CIA Seize Cleric, WASH. POST, July 6, 206, at Al 5. German prosecu-
tors have also opened an investigation into the use of Ramstein airbase in connection with the
kidnapping of Abu Omar. Whitlock, Europeans Probe Secret CIA Flights, supra.
Another example of abduction involves Mamdouh Habib, an Australian citizen pulled from a
bus in Pakistan by local authorities shortly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Ass'n
of the Bar of the City of N.Y. & Ctr. for Human Rights and Global Justice, Torture by Proxy:
International and Domestic Law Applicable to "Extraordinary Renditions," at 12 (2004), avail-
able at http://www.abcny.org/pdf/report/Torture%20by%2OProxy%20-%2OFinal%20(PDF).pdf;
see also MCCOY, supra note 36, at 173; Raymond Bonner, Detainee Says He Was Tortured While
in U.S. Custody, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2005, at Al; Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Adds to Detained Austra-
lians' Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2003, at A22; Megan K. Stack & Bob Drogin, A Detainee's
Long Odyssey Toward Freedom, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at Al. After his abduction, U.S. per-
sonnel delivered Habib to Egypt, where he endured six months of torture. Ass'n of the Bar of the
City of N.Y. & Ctr. for Human Rights and Global Justice, supra, at 12; see also McCoy, supra
note 36, at 173; Bonner, supra; Mayer, supra note 46, at 118; Rod McGuirk, Freed Terror Sus-
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pect Alleges Torture Under U.S. Custody, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 14, 2005, at A5; Priest, supra
note 47; Dana Priest & Dan Eggen, Terror Suspect Alleges Torture, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2005, at
Al; Stack & Drogin, supra. Following his release from Egyptian custody, Habib spent a week in
U.S. custody at Bagram airbase in Afghanistan and over two years in U.S. custody at Guan-
tdnamo Bay. MCCOY, supra note 36, at 173; Bonner, supra. During his detention at GuantAnamo
Bay, interrogators allegedly subjected him to sexual violence, including an incident in which a
female interrogator smeared him with what appeared to be menstrual blood. Bonner, supra. After
forty months of detention, the United States released Habib and returned him to Australia without
charge or explanation. Bonner, supra; Jehl & Johnston, supra note 47; Mayer, supra note 46, at
118.
49. For example, in December 2001, Swedish authorities arrested two unsuccessful Egyptian
asylum-seekers, Muhammad Zery and Ahmed Agiza. Craig Whitlock, New Swedish Documents
Illuminate CIA Action, WASH. POST, May 21, 2005, at AI [hereinafter Whitlock, New Swedish
Documents]; Craig Whitlock, A Secret Deportation of Terror Suspects, WASH. POST, July 25,
2004, at Al [hereinafter Whitlock, A Secret Deportation of Terror Suspects]. Within hours,
Swedish officials transferred them into CIA custody for delivery to Egypt, where authorities al-
legedly subjected them to torture including electric shocks. Mayer, supra note 46, at 118;
Whitlock, New Swedish Documents, supra; Whitlock, A Secret Deportation of Terror Suspects,
supra. Egypt released one of the men after nearly two years and sentenced the other to a lengthy
prison term. Whitlock, A Secret Deportation of Terror Suspects, supra. Swedish government offi-
cials now regard the deportation as an embarrassing mistake. Id.
Another example of transfer from official custody involves Canadian citizen Maher Arar, who
in September 2002 was transiting through Kennedy International Airport on his way home from a
family vacation in Tunisia. Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 252-53 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); Ian
Austen, Canadians Fault U.S. for Its Role in Torture Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2006, at A1;
Herbert, supra note 47; Mayer, supra note 46, at 106. Based on erroneous information provided
by Canada's Royal Mounted Police, U.S. immigration officials detained Arar in the United States
for thirteen days. Austen, supra; Mayer, supra note 46, at 106; Red Coats with Red Faces,
ECONOMIST, Sept. 23, 2006, at 42. Thereafter, the Deputy Attorney General authorized Arar's
transfer to Syria without informing Canadian officials and despite Arar's pleas that Syria would
subject him to torture. Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 253-54. See Editorial, Abu Ghraib's Abuses Re-
quire a Wider Focus, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), May 8, 2004, at A24 (noting that "the deputy
attorney-general of the United States signed off on [Arar's] deportation").
After holding him for ten months in a grave-like cell and subjecting him to severe beatings
with electrical cables, Syria released Arar because it could find no evidence of any links to terror-
ist activities. Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 254-55; Austen, supra, at Al; Bob Herbert, Op-Ed, The
Torturers Win, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2006, at A15; Mayer, supra note 46, at 106; Scott Shane,
Torture Victim Had No Terror Link, Canada Told US., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2006, at A10. Fol-
lowing the lengthy investigation of a commission headed by a Canadian judge, Canada's gov-
ernment has acknowledged Arar's innocence and its own grave mistake of setting in motion the
train of events that led to his needless detention and torture. Austen, supra; Ian Austen, Canadian
Man Tortured in Syria Wants Explanation from US., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2006, at A12; Red
Coats with Red Faces, supra; Shane, supra; Doug Struck, Canadian Police Official Apologizes
for Mistakes, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2006, at A16.
50. ERIK SAAR & VIVECA NOVAK, INSIDE THE WIRE 247 (2005); Jehl & Johnston, supra note
47; Mayer, supra note 46, at 106-07; Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but De-
fends Interrogations, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at AI; Sliva, EU Lawmakers Say CIA Con-
ducted 1,000 Secret Flights, supra note 47; Torture by Proxy, supra note 47; Van Natta, supra
note 47.
5 1. On October 11, 2002, members of Joint Task Force 170 at Guantdnamo Bay requested
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approval for a series of interrogation methods, including "removal of clothing." See Memoranda
from LTC Diane E. Beaver, Staff Judge Advocate to Commander, Joint Task Force 170 (Oct. 11,
2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS 226, 229-35 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel
eds., 2005) [hereinafter TORTURE PAPERS]; Memorandum from LTC Jerald Phifer, Dir., J2, to
Commander, Joint Task Force 170 (Oct. 11, 2002) [hereinafter Memorandum from LTC Jerald
Phifer], reprinted in TORTURE PAPERS, supra, at 227-28. On October 11, 2002, the commander
of Joint Task Force 170 forwarded the request to the commander of the United States Southern
Command. See Memorandum from Maj. Gen. Michael E. Dunlavey to Commander, U.S. S.
Command (Oct. 11, 2002), reprinted in TORTURE PAPERS, supra, at 225. Two weeks later, the
commander of the United States Southern Command forwarded the request to the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. See Memorandum from Gen. James T. Hill to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff (Oct. 25, 2002), reprinted in TORTURE PAPERS, supra, at 223. On November 27, 2002, the
Defense Department's general counsel forwarded the request to Secretary of Defense Donald H.
Rumsfeld, who granted approval on December 2, 2002. See Memorandum from William J.
Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, to Sec'y of Def. (Nov. 27, 2002) (countersigned with approval by Sec-
retary Rumsfeld on Dec. 2, 2002), reprinted in TORTURE PAPERS, supra, at 236-37.
Faced with a quiet revolt by Alberto Mora, the Navy's general counsel, Secretary Rumsfeld
rescinded blanket approval for two categories of interrogation techniques, including the removal
of clothing. Memorandum from Donald H. Rumsfeld, Sec'y of Def., to Commander, U.S. S.
Command (Jan. 15, 2003) [hereinafter Rumsfeld Memo to S. Command], reprinted in TORTURE
PAPERS, supra, at 239; Memorandum from LTC Jerald Phifer, supra (listing "removal of cloth-
ing" as a Category 1I technique). See Tim Golden, Senior Lawyer at Pentagon Broke Ranks on
Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2006, at A8 (discussing Mora's objections and indicating that he
warned superiors that authorization of the techniques could expose administration officials to
prosecution); Jane Mayer, The Experiment, NEW YORKER, July 11 & 18, 2005, at 60, 70 [herein-
after Mayer, The Experiment] (same); Jane Mayer, The Memo, NEW YORKER, Feb. 27, 2006, at
32 [hereinafter Mayer, The Memo] (same). While removing blanket authority for such tactics,
Rumsfeld held open the possibility that he might approve them for individual cases. Rumsfeld
Memo to S. Command, supra.
Contemporaneously, Secretary Rumsfeld established a working group to examine and recom-
mend a list of interrogation techniques. Memorandum from Donald H. Rumsfeld, Sec'y of Def.,
to Gen. Counsel of the Dep't of Def. (Jan. 15, 2003), reprinted in TORTURE PAPERS, supra, at
238; Mayer, The Experiment, supra, at 70. Less than three months later, that working group pro-
posed "removal of clothing" as an "effective" but "aggressive" means of interrogation. See Work-
ing Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of
Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations (Apr. 4, 2003), reprinted in TORTURE
PAPERS, supra, at 286, 342-43; see also PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 42, at 14,
87-89.
Even after Rumsfeld's January 15, 2003, memorandum, one member of a Guantanamo "Tiger
Team" stated to high-level investigators that interrogators retained authority to employ "removal
of clothing as an 'ego down' technique." George R. Fay, Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Deten-
tion Facility and the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, reprinted in THE ABU GHRAIB
INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 46, at 109, 156 [hereinafter Fay Report]. This seems consistent with
the conclusions later articulated in a report by Lieutenant General Randall M. Schmidt and Briga-
dier General John T. Furlow. See infra note 52 and accompanying text. Likewise, two high-level
Army reports found that U.S. headquarters in Afghanistan continued to list and use "removal of
clothing" as an approved interrogation technique after Rumsfeld's January 15, 2003, memoran-
dum. Fay Report, supra, at 155; Schlesinger Report, supra note 46, at 72; see also PHYSICIANS
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 42, at 5, 45, 91-92 (indicating that during 2003, 2004, and 2005,
coalition forces in Afghanistan were still subjecting detainees to forced nudity and other forms of
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sexual humiliation).
Thus, "removal of clothing for both M[ilitary] I[ntelligence] and M[ilitary] P[olice] objectives
was authorized, approved, and employed in Afghanistan and Guantanamo." Fay Report, supra, at
155. Later, the practice migrated to Iraq through temporary and long-term redeployment of per-
sonnel assigned to gather intelligence about the unexpectedly popular and brutal insurgency in
that country. Fay Report, supra, at 154-55; Schlesinger Report, supra note 46, at 7-8, 10, 14-15,
68, 72; MCCOY, supra note 36, at 133, 137, 153-54, 156; see also Jane Mayer, A Deadly Interro-
gation, NEW YORKER, Nov. 14, 2005, at 44, 47 ("By the summer of 2003, the insurgency against
the U.S. occupation of Iraq had grown into a confounding and lethal insurrection.... On orders
from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, General Geoffrey Miller, who had overseen coer-
cive interrogations of terrorist suspects at Guantanamo, imposed similar methods at Abu
Ghraib.").
Following the migration of forced nudity to Iraq, Army investigators concluded that it became
a "seemingly common" tool, that soldiers and officers believed they had authority to use it as an
"ego-down" interrogation technique, and that recourse to nudity was "probabl[y]... sanctioned at
some level within the chain-of-command." Fay Report, supra, at 113, 156, 159, 161, 164; see
also Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on the Treatment by the
Coalition Forces of Prisoners of War and Other ProtectedPersons by the Geneva Conventions in
Iraq During Arrest, Internment and Interrogation, 25-26 (Feb. 2004),
http://www.stopwar.org.uk/Resources/icrc.pdf (listing the "systematic" use of forced nudity as
one of the forms of mistreatment most frequently alleged to occur at the coalition's detention cen-
ters in Iraq); PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 42, at 36 ("Forced nudity was used not
as a punishment, nor as an exception, but as an accepted method of interrogation at Abu
Ghraib.").
52. Randall M. Schmidt & John T. Furlow, Army Regulation 15-6: Final Report (Investiga-
tion into FBI Allegations of Detainee Abuse at Guantinamo Bay, Cuba Detention Facility), at 7-
8, 15, 19-20 (June 9, 2005), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us-law/detainees/
schmidt-anny-reg-150605.pdf (indicating that all such gambits fell within the scope of approved
interrogation tactics, but criticizing their use without advance approval or when combined with
160 days of isolation and nearly forty-eight consecutive days of eighteen to twenty-hour interro-
gations, yet still concluding that such combinations "did not rise to the level of prohibited inhu-
mane treatment"); see Josh White, Military Lawyers Say Tactics Broke Rules, WASH. POST, Mar.
16, 2006, at A13; see also Fay Report, supra note 51 (recounting a Guant6.namo "Tiger Team"
member's belief that interrogators retained authority to employ "removal of clothing as an 'ego
down' technique"); David Luban, Op-Ed, Torture, American-Style, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2005,
at BI (expressing amazement at Lieutenant General Schmidt's and Brigadier General Furlow's
conclusion that such tactics constituted "humane" treatment falling within the scope of tactics
"already authorized by U.S. Army doctrine"); Mayer, The Experiment, supra note 51, at 61 (re-
cording the opinion of Brigadier General Jay W. Hood, commander of the detention camp at
Guantdnamo, that such conduct probably did not "rise to the level of abuse"); Mayer, The Memo,
supra note 51 (quoting a senior Defense Department official for the proposition that such tactics
were "within the bounds"); White, supra (recording the opinion of General Bantz J. Craddock,
commander of the U.S. Southern Command, that such conduct might be "creative and aggres-
sive," but that it "did not violate any U.S. law or policy").
Numerous sources have reported incidents involving female interrogators who smeared fake
menstrual blood on a devout Muslim detainee. See PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note
42, at 25, 27; SAAR & NOVAK, supra note 50, at 226-28; Anne Applebaum, Blaming the Messen-
ger, WASH. POST, May 18, 2005, at A 17; Bonner, supra note 48; Maureen Dowd, Op-Ed, Torture
Chicks Gone Wild, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2005, § 4 at 14; Eggen & White, supra note 36; Carol D.
Leonnig, Desecration of Koran Had Been Reported Before, WASH. POST, May 18, 2005, at A 12;
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Neil A. Lewis & Eric Schmitt, Inquiry Finds Abuses at Guantdenamo Bay, N.Y. TIMES, May 1,
2005, at 35; Mayer, The Experiment, supra note 51, at 60, 65; Conor O'Clery, New Prisoner
Abuse Claims, IRISH TIMES, Feb. 19, 2005, at 11; Self-Inflicted Wounds, supra note 47; Editorial,
Torturers' Tricks Debasing Country's Mission at Guantdtnamo Bay, DAYTONA BEACH NEWS-J.,
Feb. 7, 2005, at 4A. The United States has confirmed only one such incident. See Carol D. Leon-
nig & Dana Priest, Detainees Accuse Female Interrogators, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 2005, at Al
(indicating that in January 2005, "a Pentagon spokesman confirmed it had verbally reprimanded
one female interrogator" for one such incident in early 2003). A careful reading of news accounts
suggests that interrogators may have smeared multiple detainees with fake menstrual blood.
Leonnig & Priest, supra. Compare Bonner, supra note 48 (describing the use of this technique
against an Australian detainee), and O'Clery, supra (same), with SAAR & NOVAK, supra note 50,
at 226-28 (describing the use of this technique against a Saudi detainee), and Dowd, supra
(same).
Numerous sources have also reported the gratuitous administration of enemas to detainees. See
Neil A. Lewis, Fresh Details Emerge on Harsh Methods at Guanttnamo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1,
2005, at A ll (describing interviews with former intelligence officers and interrogators, who indi-
cated that at least one detainee was "forcibly given an enema" because "it was uncomfortable and
degrading," and indicating that several detainees may have received similar treatment); Joseph
Margulies, Wiggle Room on Cruelty, WASH. POST, July 17, 2006, at A 15 (asserting that interro-
gators "forcibly administered an enema" to a prisoner in solitary confinement at Guantd.namo);
Michelle Mittelstadt, Gonzales Confirmed by Senate, LONG BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM, Feb. 4,
2005, at Al (quoting Senator Edward Kennedy's statement to the effect that U.S. interrogators
have "administered forced enemas"); Clint Talbott, "Bad People" Deserve Trials, BOULDER
DAILY CAMERA, June 15, 2005 (indicating that "[i]nterrogators have used enemas as a form of
punishment"); Editorial, Public Silent as Rules of Civil Society Are Rewritten, DAYTONA NEWS-
J., Jan. 4, 2005, at 4A (stating that "the torture of prisoners at Guantfinamo has included forced
enemas"); Editorial, The Torture Question, BALT. SUN, Feb. 20, 2005, at 5F (describing "involun-
tary enemas" as one of the few details about "U.S. torture policy" that have "only trickled out");
Torturers' Tricks Debasing Country's Mission at Guanthnamo Bay, supra (indicating that the
means of abuse at Guantd.namo Bay "vary from beatings to sleep deprivation to denials of per-
sonal hygiene to forced enemas").
Other sources have reported the gratuitous administration of body cavity searches. See Rasul
v. Rumsfeld, 414 F. Supp. 2d 26, 27-28 (D.D.C. 2006) (summarizing allegations, including
forced nudity and body cavity searches); PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 42, at 23
(describing the claims of three British detainees of being subjected to "forced cavity searches,
which...'were used to degrade and humiliate them"'); Paul C. Campos, Editorial, Bush Admini-
stration Wrongly Defends Torture, AUGUSTA CHRON., Nov. 23, 2005, at A5 (describing a
Guantdinamo Bay prisoner's subjection "to body cavity searches despite having spent 160 days in
solitary confinement"); Tim Golden, In U.S. Report, Brutal Details of 2 Afghan Inmates 'Deaths,
N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2005, at Al (discussing three detainees, who all claimed to have been
beaten at Bagram air base in Afghanistan, but who "complained most bitterly of being stripped
naked in front of female soldiers for showers and medical examinations, which they said included
the first of several painful and humiliating rectal exams"); Nicholas D. Kristof, Sami's Shame,
and Ours, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2006, at A21 (discussing an Al Jazeera cameraman detained at
Bagram airbase and Guantinamo Bay since December 2001, who was "subjected to anal cavity
searches in public 'just to humiliate [him]"'); Mayer, The Experiment, supra note 51, at 60 (men-
tioning that Brigadier General Jay W. Hood "banished regular 'cavity searches' for detainees" at
Guantinamo only after March 2004); Gary Sheftick, Army Detainee Ops Plan Includes 35 New
Units, Pentagon Brief, Mar. 1, 2005, at 3 (describing the elimination of "cavity searches" as a
"recently implemented" change at U.S. detention centers); see also Whitlock, New Swedish Docu-
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ments, supra note 49 (describing the surprise of Swedish police officers when confronted with a
U.S. extraordinary rendition team that insisted on strip-searching two prisoners even though
Swedish police had already searched them and placed them in handcuffs).
Sources have also reported examples of female interrogators grabbing or striking the genitals
of detainees. Letter from T.J. Harrington, Deputy Assistant Dir., FBI Counterterrorism Div., to
Maj. Gen. Donald J. Ryder (July 14, 2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/
released/FBI_4622_4624.pdf (describing an FBI special agent's observation of an interrogation
during which a female interrogator whispered into a detainee's ear, caressed him, rubbed lotion
onto his arms, and grabbed his genitals); see PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 42, at
25 (reporting an incident in which an FBI agent witnessed a female interrogator grab the genitals
of a Guantdnamo detainee); SAAR & NOVAK, supra note 50, at 244 (describing an incident in
which "a marine told an FBI observer that [a female interrogator] had squeezed the detainee's
genitals"); Edward Alden, FBI Saw Abu Ghraib-Style Tactics in Guantcinamo Bay Jail Two Years
Ago, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2004, at 2 (reporting that, in late 2002, FBI agents witnessed a "female
interrogator grabbing the genitals of a male prisoner" at Guantfnamo Bay); Neil A. Lewis, Iraqi
Prisoner Abuse Reported After Abu Ghraib Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2004, at A12 (describ-
ing the account of an FBI official who had witnessed "a female interrogator squeezing the geni-
tals" of a Guantdnamo detainee); Lewis & Schmitt, supra (reporting that "FBI agents wrote in
memorandums that.. .they had seen female interrogators forcibly squeeze male prisoners' geni-
tals"); Priest & Eggen, supra note 48 (describing the existence of documents showing that "FBI
personnel serving in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Guantanamo Bay" had witnessed "incidents in which
military interrogators grabbed prisoners' genitals"); see also PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
supra note 42, at 21 (describing Mamdouh Habib's claim that female soldiers at Bagram airbase
"'touched [him] in the private areas' while questioning him" in April 2002); Golden, supra (dis-
cussing the sworn statements of soldiers in Afghanistan, who described "one female interrogator
with a taste for humiliation stepping on the neck of one prostrate detainee and kicking another in
the genitals").
Other sources have reported examples of female interrogators rubbing their breasts against de-
tainees. SAAR & NOVAK, supra note 50, at 224; Dowd, supra; Leonnig & Priest, supra; see also
PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 42, at 6, 27 (reporting that in 2003 female interro-
gators at Guantdnamo Bay "sat on detainees' laps and fondled themselves or detainees, opened
their blouses and pushed their breasts in the faces of detainees, opened their skirts.. .and forced
detainees to look at pornographic pictures or videos").
Sources have also reported examples of female interrogators touching detainees in other sexu-
ally provocative ways. Memorandum for Record, from [Name Redacted], ACS Def. Analyst, to
[Name Redacted], ACS PM (Apr. 26, 2003), available at http://action.aclu.org/torture
foia.released/072605/1243_ 1381 .pdf (FOIA release pages 1333-34) (describing a female interro-
gator's performance of "the proverbial 'strip club lap dance"' on a male detainee); see Leonnig &
Priest, supra (recounting allegations, generally confirmed by a Pentagon investigation, that fe-
male interrogators "rubbed their bodies against" male detainees, "wore skimpy clothes in front of
them, made sexually explicit remarks and touched them provocatively"); Mayer, The Experiment,
supra note 5 I, at 62 (describing how a detainee tried to head-butt a female interrogator who em-
braced him from behind); Priest & Eggen, supra note 48 (describing government e-mails refer-
ring to an incident in which a female interrogator rubbed lotion on male prisoner during Rama-
dan); see also SAAR & NOVAK, supra note 50, at 191-92 (describing a female contract
interrogator's attempts to provoke a Guant namo detainee by taking off her dress and questioning
him while in her bra and thong underwear).
According to one former intelligence analyst at Guantdnamo, the Army's Behavioral Science
Consultant Teams conceived and promoted the use of sexual gambits to disturb prisoners. See
Mayer, The Experiment, supra note 5 1, at 65. Another source reports that "sexually oriented tac-
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tics may have been part of the fabric of Guantgnamo interrogations, especially in 2003." Leonnig
& Priest, supra; see also PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 42, at 6 (indicating that
the use of female interrogators at Guantdnamo Bay "appeared to decline in 2004"); Editorial, Abu
Ghraib, Caribbean Style, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2004, at A30 (describing Red Cross reports to the
effect that "GuantAnamo prisoners complained less frequently in 2004 than in 2003 about female
interrogators who exposed their breasts, kissed prisoners, touched them sexually and showed
them pornography"); Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse in Guantnamo, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 30, 2004, at Al (citing a Red Cross report for the proposition that "there were fre-
quent complaints by prisoners in 2003 that some of the female interrogators baited their subjects
with sexual overtures"); Lewis & Schmitt, supra (citing a June 2003 International Committee of
the Red Cross Report to the effect that "the use of sexual taunts by female interrogators was
prevalent in 2002 and early 2003, but stopped abruptly in the middle of that year").
53. See Editorial, Misplaced Outrage, USA TODAY, Nov. 14, 2005, at 20A (complaining that
the "CIA has been hiding al-Qaeda suspects and interrogating them at secret prisons in Eastern
Europe and elsewhere-essentially making them disappear, as South American and Soviet dicta-
tors once did"); Rebellion Against Abuse, supra note 45 (opining that "the CIA maintains its own
network of secret prisons, into which 100 or more terrorist suspects have 'disappeared' as if they
were victims of a Third World dictatorship"); Eugene Robinson, Editorial, Torture Whitewash,
WASH. POST, May 3, 2005, at A21 (observing that some prisoners "have simply 'disappeared,' as
if the U.S. government were some Latin American junta whose generals wear gold-braided epau-
lets as big as vultures").
